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Abstract: This study evaluates the validity and reliability of a new instrument developed to assess 
symptoms of depersonalization: the Structured Clinical Interview for the Depersonalization-
Derealization Spectrum (SCI-DER). The instrument is based on a spectrum model that 
emphasizes soft-signs, sub-threshold syndromes as well as clinical and subsyndromal manifes-
tations. Items of the interview include, in addition to DSM-IV criteria for depersonalization, a 
number of features derived from clinical experience and from a review of phenomenological 
descriptions. Study participants included 258 consecutive patients with mood and anxiety 
disorders, 16.7% bipolar I disorder, 18.6% bipolar II disorder, 32.9% major depression, 22.1% 
panic disorder, 4.7% obsessive compulsive disorder, and 1.5% generalized anxiety disorder; 
2.7% patients were also diagnosed with depersonalization disorder. A comparison group of 
42 unselected controls was enrolled at the same site. The SCI-DER showed excellent reliability 
and good concurrent validity with the Dissociative Experiences Scale. It signiﬁ  cantly discrimi-
nated subjects with any diagnosis of mood and anxiety disorders from controls and subjects 
with depersonalization disorder from controls. The hypothesized structure of the instrument 
was conﬁ  rmed empirically.
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Introduction
Depersonalization (DP) is deﬁ  ned as an experience in which the individual 
feels a sense of unreality and detachment from him/herself. DP is often associated 
with derealization (DR), which consists of an alteration in the perception of one’s 
surroundings so that sense of the reality of the external world is lost. A perceived change 
in the size or shape of objects in the external world is common and people may be 
perceived as dead or mechanical. All of these feelings are egodystonic and the individual 
maintains grossly intact reality testing, meaning that the sufferer retains insight that 
these are subjective phenomena rather than objective reality (APA 2000).
The above deﬁ  nitions oversimplify conditions that in clinical practice mostly 
present as complex phenomena. DP may occur in healthy individuals (lasting only a 
few seconds), often under conditions of stress, fatigue, drug use, or sleep deprivation 
(Giesbrecht et al 2007) and has been described in a number of psychiatric conditions 
such as anxiety disorder (especially panic disorder), major depression, or bipolar 
disorder (Hunter et al 2004).
The depersonalization disorder (DPD) is currently classiﬁ  ed, in the DSM-IV-TR, 
as a dissociative disorder (APA 2000), in which DP symptoms persist chronically and 
unremittingly. The essential feature of the dissociative disorders is a sudden, temporary 
alteration in the normally integrative functions of consciousness, identity, or motor 
behavior and DPD has been included among these disorders because the feeling of Neuropsychiatric Disease and Treatment 2008:4(5) 978
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one’s own reality, an important component of identity, is 
lost. However, it is important to acknowledge that while 
this may be true for some of the other dissociative disorders 
(ie, amnesia, fugue, or dissociative identity disorder), this 
is not true for DPD, being extremely chronic and subject 
to little ﬂ  uctuation. Moreover, according to DSM-IV-TR 
criteria, symptoms of DP, even if recurrent and causing 
signiﬁ  cant distress, do not allow a diagnosis of DPD, if they 
are secondary to any other mental illness or neurologic distur-
bances such as epilepsy or migraine. Finally, most researchers 
endorse the view that, in addition to ineffable feelings of 
unreality, DP also includes emotional numbing, heightened 
self-observation, changes in body experience (with the 
sensation of being an outside observer of one’s body, or 
parts of one’s body), distortions in the experiencing of time 
and space, changes in the feeling of agency (with automaton 
or robot-like experiences, a sensation of lacking control of 
one’s actions), feelings of having the mind empty of thoughts, 
memories and/or images, an inability to focus and sustain 
attention and various types of sensory anesthesia (Lewis 
1931; Mayer-Gross 1935; Sierra and Berrios 1998; Sierra 
and Berrios 2001; Simeon 2004; Sierra et al 2005; Simeon 
et al 2007).
In order to accommodate all these different manifesta-
tions, that are not unique only to DPD, we postulated a 
DP spectrum model that emphasizes soft signs and low-
grade symptoms as well as a wide range of clinical and 
subsyndromical manifestations. Such a model may have 
important practical implications as we recently pointed out 
that DP symptoms may be of great value for prognosis and 
treatment of affective disorders (Mula et al 2007). This paper 
reports on the acceptability, validity and reliability of a new 
instrument to assess DP symptoms, the Structured Clinical 
Interview for Depersonalization-Derealization Spectrum 
(SCI-DER), in a mixed sample of patients with DPD, mood 
and anxiety disorders as compared to healthy controls.
Methods
Subjects
A consecutive sample of out-inpatients presenting for 
treatment at the Department of Psychiatry in Pisa, Italy, from 
September 2006 to September 2007 were invited to participate 
in the study. Eligible patients included new and continuing 
patients aged 18 years and over with affective disorders (mood 
and anxiety disorders) or depersonalization disorder (DPD). 
Exclusion criteria were severe medical illness, neurological 
diseases, or inability to participate because of the severity of 
psychiatric symptoms. Patients were compared with a sample 
of unselected controls. Controls were university students and 
nonpsychiatric subjects.
The Ethics Committee of the Azienda Ospedaliera 
Universitaria of Pisa approved all recruitment and assessment 
procedures. Eligible subjects provided written informed 
consent after receiving a complete description of the study 
and having an opportunity to ask questions. Subjects were 
not paid for their participation.
Instruments
Diagnostic assessment
The diagnostic interview consisted of the administration 
of the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV Axis-I 
disorders (SCID-I/P) (First et al 2002), the Dissociative 
Experiences Scale (DES) (Bernstein and Putnam 1986), the 
Body Sensation Questionnaire (Chambless et al 1984), and 
the SCI-DER. The diagnosis of DPD accorded to DSM-IV 
criteria. These assessments were conducted by psychiatrists 
and experienced nonphysician research clinicians who were 
trained in the use of the study instruments at the Department 
of Psychiatry of the University of Pisa.
Dissociative Experiences Scale
The DES is a lifetime 28-items self-rating questionnaire 
speciﬁ  cally developed as a screening instrument to identify 
subjects that are likely to have a dissociative disorder. DES 
showed to be valid with a good internal consistency and 
very good test-retest reliability (four weeks = 0.93; eight 
weeks = 0.90; one year = 0.78). Since its introduction, the 
DES has been used in hundreds of dissociation studies and 
different cut off scores have been proposed, 20 (Steinberg 
et al 1991), 25 (Draijer and Boon 1993), 30 (Carlson and 
Putnam 1993) (for a more detailed review see van Ijzendoorn 
and Schuengel 1996; Simeon et al 1998).
Body Sensation Questionnaire
The Body Sensations Questionnaire (BSQ) is a validated 
self-rating scale for the assessment of agoraphobic and panic 
symptoms. The instrument showed to be reliable and fared 
well on tests of discriminant and construct validity. This 
instrument was chosen to deal with views, occasionally 
expressed in the clinical literature, that DP may be related 
to anxiety (Roth 1959) and is frequently reported by patients 
with agoraphobia (Cassano et al 1989).
The Structured Clinical Interview for Derealization-
Depersonalization Spectrum
The SCI-DER (see Appendix A) was developed at the 
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and Biotechnologies of the University of Pisa by experienced 
psychiatrists. It includes 49 items exploring “presence” or 
“absence” of lifetime spontaneous symptoms of DP organized 
into four domains: (1) Derealization, (2) Somatopsychic 
depersonalization, (3) Autopsychic depersonalization, and 
(4) Affective depersonalization. Items responses are coded in 
a dichotomous way (yes/no) and total and domain scores are 
obtained by counting the number of positive answers. When DP 
symptoms occur during alcohol or drug intake, items are coded 
as negative. An initial version of the scale was piloted in patients 
with DPD and comments were also solicited from researchers 
with experience in scale construction. The information obtained 
guided the rephrasing of some questions.
The ﬁ  rst domain, Derealization, encompasses all items 
referring to an altered experience of the external world, 
and corresponds to the DSM description of derealization. 
Such an experience is frequently described in terms of 
visual metaphors (eg, looking through the fog, a veil 
between you and the external world). The Somatopsychic 
depersonalization domain describes a variety of changes in 
body experience such as lack of body ownership feelings, 
feelings of disembodiment, which can range from a non-
speciﬁ  c feeling of not being in the body to out-of-body 
experiences and autoscopic hallucinations. Somatosensory 
distortions, usually affecting the size of body parts, or 
feeling very light, and lack of body sensations or various 
types of sensory anesthesia (eg, hunger, thirst, and pain) 
are also present. The Autopsychic depersonalization domain 
includes the unfamiliarity of the self in terms of sensation of 
being an outside observer of one’s mental process, not being 
“in charge” of their own behavior or mental processes, the 
automaton-line experience and anomalous subjective recall 
(eg, the feeling that personal events happened long ago or 
had already happened, inability to evoke visual memories of 
people or places). The Affective depersonalization domain 
explores the patient’s loss of ability to imbue perceptions 
with emotional feelings but also comprises the loss of 
affection, pleasure, fear or disgust to situations previously 
avoided.
Items were derived starting from a review of the 
descriptive psychopathology of DP (Jaspers 1913; Lewis 
1931; Mayer-Gross 1935; Roth 1959; Sierra and Berrios 
1998, 2001; Simeon et al 2004; Mula et al 2007) which 
included also a validated instrument for DP, namely the 
Cambridge Depersonalization Scale (CDS) (Sierra and 
Berrios 2000). The SCI-DER has some overlap with the 
CDS but, differently, the CDS was developed to capture 
frequency and duration of DP experiences in a period 
covering the last 6 months while the SCI-DER was designed 
to assess the presence/absence of DP experiences over 
the lifetime. In this regard, it is worth remarking that our 
instrument was designed not to be diagnostic, in fact the 
duration, clustering, and severity of symptoms requested 
to make a diagnosis according to DSM-IV cannot be 
determined. Thus, the SCI-DER cannot replace currently 
used psychiatric interviews, such as the Structured Clinical 
Interview for DSM-IV Dissociative Disorders-Revised 
(SCID-D-R) (Bremner et al 1993), but it allows the deﬁ  nition 
and recognition, together with the typical aspects of DPD, 
of a wider area of clinical manifestations.
In summary, the SCI-DER is aimed to complement the 
categorical diagnosis with a new dimensional approach that 
gives clinical signiﬁ  cance to a number of manifestations 
that may play an important role in modifying the typical 
presentation of a psychiatric disorder, especially affective 
disorders, and interfere with treatment.
Statistical methods
Kunder-Richardson coefficient, a variant of the alpha 
coefﬁ  cient (Nunnally and Bernstein, 1994), was used to test 
the internal consistency of domains and total score of the 
SCI-DER. Intraclass correlation coefﬁ  cients (Bartko 1966; 
Shrout and Fleiss 1979) were calculated to check test-retest 
reliability and one-way random effects model was used. 
Landis and Koch (1977) criteria were used to characterize 
reliability levels as follows: 0–0.4 poor, 0.41–0.74 from fair 
to good, 0.75–1 excellent.
Convergent and divergent validity was analyzed using 
Pearson’s r correlation.
The scores of the SCI-DER domains were compared 
between clinical and control groups by using Mann-Whitney 
test. Analyses were carried out using SPSS version 15.0 for 
Windows (SPSS Inc. Chicago, IL, USA).
Results
Demographic and clinical characteristics 
of the study sample
Three hundred subjects participated in the study. Mean age 
was 41.8 ± 14.1 years, 61% were women and 39% men, 
48.3% married, 5.3% separated or divorced, 43.3% never 
married, 44% had a high school diploma, 21% the University 
degree, 51% were employed. Of the assessed subjects, 
258 had a DSM diagnosis of mood or anxiety disorder or 
DPD (Table 1) and control subjects were 42. Control subjects 
were signiﬁ  cantly younger than those in the clinical sample 
(31.5 ± 9.6 vs 43.5 ± 14 Z = 5.739 p   0.001) but the gender Neuropsychiatric Disease and Treatment 2008:4(5) 980
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distribution did not differ between the two groups (women 
64.3% vs 60.5% Chi-square = 0.222 Fisher’s 2-sided exact 
test p = 0.734).
There was no gender difference in SCI-DER total score 
(males = 14.3 ± 9.1 vs females = 16.4 ± 10.2; t = −1.828; 
df = 298; p = 0.069). There was a signiﬁ  cant, though very 
weak, negative correlation with age (r = −0.125; p = 0.031).
Acceptability and reliability
The SCI-DER was administered in about 20 minutes and in 
one session to all subjects. No subject refused to undertake 
and complete the interview and the acceptability was 
extremely good.
Frequency of endorsement of SCI-DER items is shown in 
Table 2. Internal consistency for the total SCI-DER score and 
for three domains (Derealization, Somatopsychic deperson-
alization, and Autopsychic depersonalization) was excellent; 
for the domain “Affective depersonalization” the internal 
consistency was good (Table 3). Correlations between 
domains were all positive and signiﬁ  cant, with Pearson’s 
r ranging between 0.53 and 0.68 (p   0.001).
To evaluate test-retest reliability of the SCI-DER, 
the questionnaire was re-administered to a subsample of 
69 patients after 15–20 days. The intraclass correlation 
of the total SCI-DER score was r = 0.88 and that of 
the domains was r = 0.79 (Derealization), r = 0.74 
(Somatopsychic depersonalization), r = 0.87 (Autopsychic 
depersonalization), r = 0.74 (Affective depersonalization).
Convergent and discriminant validity
Correlations with the DES, the DES subscale for deper-
sonalization symptoms (DES dp/dr) and the BSQ scores 
were examined to assess the convergent and discriminant 
validity of the SCI-DER. Results indicate good concurrent 
validity of the instrument: a strong positive correlation was 
found between SCI-DER and DES (r = 0.74), SCI-DER and 
DES dp/dr (r = 0.75). The poor correlation between overall 
SCI-DER and BSQ (r = −0.18) supports the discriminant 
Table 1 DSM-IV diagnoses in the clinical sample
  N = 258 (%)
Major depression 85 (32.9%)
Panic disorder 57 (22.1%)
Bipolar disorder II 48 (18.6%)
Bipolar disorder I 43 (16.7%)
Obsessive compulsive disorder 12 (4.7%)
Depersonalization disorder 7 (2.7%)
Generalized anxiety disorder 4 (1.5%)
Post-traumatic stress disorder 2 (0.8%)
Table 2 Frequency of endorsement of SCI-DER items in the clinical sample of patients with mood and anxiety disorders (G1) and 
healthy controls (G2)
N ITEMS G1 G2
34. … that you were going through the motions of working while your mind was somewhere else? 0.80 0.88
40. …   that after listening to someone talk, you suddenly realized that you did not hear part or all of what 
was said?
0.80 0.88
37. … that when in a new situation, you had been there before? 0.64 0.74
38. … that when remembering a past event, it seemed so vivid it was as if you were reliving it? 0.63 0.45
26. … that your behavior was out of control? 0.63 0.21
43. … that your emotions were not in your control? 0.62 0.29
2. …   that you felt detached from your surroundings as if there were a veil between you and the outside 
world?
0.58 0.12
8. … feeling strange as if you were cut off from the world? 0.57 0.14
48. …   that you are able to do things with amazing ease and spontaneity that would usually be difﬁ  cult for you 
(for example, sports, work, social situations, etc.)?
0.52 0.45
36. …   as if things that you have recently done had taken place a long time ago, for example, something you did 
this morning feels as if it were done weeks ago?
0.45 0.36
1. … that the outside world was strange and unreal? 0.45 0.19
6. … of being in a familiar place but ﬁ  nding it unfamiliar and strange? 0.42 0.19
31. … that there were moments of your life when you were very far away from what was happening to you? 0.41 0.40
47. … that you were not frightened at all in a situation that you would normally ﬁ  nd frightening or distressing? 0.41 0.26
(Continued)Neuropsychiatric Disease and Treatment 2008:4(5) 981
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Table 2 (Continued)
N ITEMS G1 G2
35. … that you could not picture things in your mind, for example, the face of a close friend or a familiar place? 0.40 0.43
27. … that you were so detached from your thoughts that they seemed to have a “life” of their own? 0.40 0.05
17. …   that you were not in charge of your movements, so that you felt “automatic” and mechanical as if you 
were a robot?
0.40 0.02
32. … that you were a “detached observer” of yourself? 0.38 0.24
7. … the feeling that you were living in a dream? 0.38 0.21
19. …   that you had lost some bodily sensations (eg, of hunger and thirst) so that when you ate or drank, it felt 
like an automatic routine?
0.35 0.12
46. … that you did not feel any affection toward your family or close friends? 0.35 0.07
39. …   that after driving or riding in a car or bus or subway, you suddenly did not remember what happened 
during all or part of the trip?
0.34 0.36
30. … that you were a little “spacey?” 0.34 0.12
44. … that what you were looking at seemed “ﬂ  at” or “lifeless?” 0.33 0.12
33. … that you were a stranger to yourself or you did not recognize yourself in the mirror? 0.33 0.07
49. …   that you were detached from memories of things that happened to you as if you had not been involved 
in them?
0.32 0.24
10. … that your body did not seem to belong to you? 0.31 0.00
22. … that you were indifferent to the taste of food whether good or bad? 0.29 0.07
9. … that familiar voices (including your own) sounded far away and unreal? 0.26 0.10
13. … that your body was very light as if it were ﬂ  oating on air? 0.26 0.07
16. … as if you were outside your body? 0.26 0.05
28. … that one part of you did things while an observing part talked to you about them? 0.26 0.02
42. … that you can turn off or detach from your emotions? 0.25 0.17
29. …   that you did not have any thoughts at all, so that when you spoke it felt as if your words were being 
uttered by a robot?
0.24 0.02
4. … the feeling that other people, objects, and the world around you were not real? 0.23 0.05
45. … that when you wept or laughed, you did not feel any emotions at all? 0.23 0.05
5. … a feeling as if you were looking at the world through a fog so that people and objects appeared unclear? 0.22 0.00
12. … that parts of your body were disconnected from the rest of your body? 0.21 0.02
11. … that parts of your body did not seem to belong to you? 0.20 0.05
41. Have you ever found yourself in a place, having no idea how you got there? 0.19 0.17
21. … that you were able to ignore pain? 0.18 0.05
23. … that you were indifferent to the smell of things whether good or bad? 0.16 0.07
15. …   that you could not properly feel objects that you touched because it felt as if it was not you 
touching them?
0.15 0.00
3. … that objects around you looked small or far away? 0.14 0.05
18. … that you had to touch yourself to make sure that you had a body or a real existence? 0.12 0.00
14. … that your hands or your feet had become larger or smaller? 0.09 0.00
24. … that, when a part of your body hurt, you felt detached from the pain, as if it were somebody else’s pain? 0.09 0.00
20. … that you were invisible? 0.06 0.02
25. Ha  ve you ever purposely hurt, burned, or cut yourself in order to feel pain or make sure that you were 
real?
0.06 0.02Neuropsychiatric Disease and Treatment 2008:4(5) 982
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validity. Table 4 shows the correlations between the 
SCI-DER domains and DES, DES dp/dr, and BSQ scores.
Relationship between depersonalization 
spectrum and depersonalization disorder
The clinical sample presented a median DES score (range) 
of 8.9 (0–82.1), a median DES-T of 5 (0–87.5), a median 
DES dp/dr of 11.4 (0–86.4) and a median BSQ of  3.9 (0–20). 
Healthy controls displayed a median DES score (range) of 4.3 
(0–19.3), a median DES-T of 3.2 (0–16.25), a median DES 
dp/dr of 5.9 (0–20.9), and a median BSQ of 4 (0–19).
Patients with mood and anxiety disorders showed 
signiﬁ  cantly higher SCI-DER total and domains scores 
as compared to control subjects. Moreover, DPD patients 
obtained signiﬁ  cantly higher score on the overall SCI-DER 
and domains than the control group (Table 5). Patients with 
a positive screening for dissociative symptoms (DES   25) 
showed higher SCI-DER total and domains scores as compared 
with those with a negative screening (Table 6).
All these data taken together indicated that all the domains 
of the SCI-DER discriminated subjects with dissociative 
symptoms from those without.
Discussion
This study provided evidence of the reliability and validity 
of the SCI-DER. The prevalence of DPD in our sample 
is in line with that reported in the general population and 
slightly under that reported in clinical samples (Hunter et al 
2004). However, the pattern of comorbidity presented by 
our patients with DPD is in keeping with current literature 
with the majority of patients being also diagnosed also panic 
disorder, one patients with major depression and one patients 
with a diagnosis of obsessive compulsive disorder (Baker 
et al 2003; Hunter et al 2004).
Available clinical instruments for DP symptoms include 
the Dixon’s Depersonalization Scale (DDS) (Dixon 1963), the 
Jacobs and Bovasso’s Depersonalization Scale (JBS) (Jacobs 
and Bovasso 1992), the Cambridge Depersonalization Scale 
(CDS) (Sierra and Berrios 2000) and the Depersonalization 
Severity Scale (DSS) (Simeon et al 2001). However, all of 
them were developed to measure severity of DP symptoms, 
in terms of frequency and duration, in a deﬁ  ned time frame 
(six to twelve months) and showed to be useful in monitor-
ing treatment response (Sierra et al 2006). Conversely, the 
SCI-DER evaluates presence of DP symptoms in a lifetime 
perspective according to a dimensional spectrum model of 
psychopathology (Cassano et al 1998; Frank et al 1998; 
Cassano et al 2002).
Our data showed an excellent internal consistency of the 
SCI-DER (0.92) especially if compared to the other instru-
ments such as the DDS (0.53–0.84), JBS (0.78–0.84), the 
CDS (0.89), and the DSS (0.59). Each DP spectrum domain 
correlated highly with the total score and removal of any 
item resulted in a lower KR-20 coefﬁ  cient.
The convergent validity of the SCI-DER was examined 
using the DES because extensively used in studies of this 
area as a gold standard, thus allowing comparisons with other 
scales. In fact, the correlation with the total DES score was 
good (0.74), in line with or higher than that reported by the 
DDS (0.47), JBS (0.71), CDS (0.49), and DSS (0.59). The 
correlation with the DES subscale for DP symptoms (DES 
dp/dr) was also good (0.75), in line with or higher than that 
reported by the DDS (0.49), JBS (0.44), CDS (0.80), and 
Table 3 Internal consistency (Kunder-Richardson coefﬁ  cient) of 
domains of the SCI-DER
SCI-DER # Items KR-20
Domain I: Derealization 9 0.79
Domain II: Somatopsychic depersonalization 16 0.83
Domain III: Autopsychic depersonalization 16 0.82
Domain IV: Affective depersonalization 8 0.69
SCI-DER Total 49 0.92
Abbreviations:
Table 4 Convergent and discriminant validity of the SCI-DER domains and total score as compared to the Dissociative Experiences 
Scale (DES), DES subscale for DP/DR symptoms (DES dp/dr) and the Body Sensation Questionnaire (BSQ)
SCI-DER DES DES dp/dr BSQ
Domain I: Derealization 0.63 0.67 −0.16
Domain II: Somatopsychic depersonalization 0.63 0.65 −0.11*
Domain III: Autopsychic depersonalization 0.64 0.63 −0.20
Domain IV: Affective depersonalization 0.60 0.59 −0.14*
SCI-DER Total 0.74 0.75 −0.18
Notes: *Correlations are signiﬁ  cant for p   0.05;  all others correlations are signiﬁ  cant for p   0.001.Neuropsychiatric Disease and Treatment 2008:4(5) 983
Validation of the SCI-DER
DSS (0.63). The SCI-DER showed good discriminant validity 
as measured with the BSQ. However, the negative correla-
tion is of interest considering that DP symptoms seem to be 
present in patients with agoraphobia (Cassano et al 1989). 
Further studies in this area are needed.
The test-retest reliability of an instrument is a key psycho-
metric property in clinical research. Test-retest reliability is 
unknown for DDS and JBS, while the SCI-DER showed an 
excellent stability of scores at 15–20 days with an intraclass 
correlation of the total SCI-DER of r = 0.88 and ranging 
between 0.74 and 0.88 for the individual domains. As for the 
CDS, the test-retest reliability is known only for the German 
version, being 0.89 at 10–14 days (Michal et al 2004).
The SCI-DER proved to be able to discriminate patients 
with any mental disorder from unselected controls and 
patients with DPD from controls (Table 5). The distribution 
of SCI-DER total and domains scores suggests a continuum 
of DP spectrum symptoms from healthy controls to DPD 
going through other mental illnesses. Indeed, it is important 
to restate that the SCI-DER was not developed to diagnose 
DPD but to investigate DP symptoms in the context of other 
psychiatric diagnoses, in particular affective disorders. Our 
view is that an increased attention to this group of symptoms, 
rarely investigated in clinical settings, may have important 
clinical implications in terms of prognosis and treatment 
strategies (Mula et al 2007).
Our results need to be considered keeping in mind the 
following limitations. First, the small sample size of DPD 
patients did not allow us to carry out more detailed analy-
ses, for instance comparison of symptom proﬁ  les between 
groups, a conﬁ  rmatory factor analysis or a ROC analysis for 
speciﬁ  city and sensitivity of the instrument. However, the 
SCI-DER was designed not for a diagnosis of DPD according 
to DSM-IV but to allow deﬁ  nition and recognition, together 
with the typical aspects of DPD, of a wider area of clinical 
manifestations in patients with mood and anxiety disorders. 
In summary, the SCI-DER is aimed to complement the 
categorical diagnosis with a new dimensional approach that 
gives clinical signiﬁ  cance to a number of manifestations that 
may play an important role in modifying the typical presenta-
tion of a psychiatric disorder, especially affective disorders. 
Second, patients with DSM diagnoses of psychotic disorders 
Table 5 SCI-DER total and domains scores in patients with depersonalization disorder (DPD), the clinical sample of patients with mood 
or anxiety disorders (CS) and control subjects (HC) (median and interquartile range)
SCI-DER DPD (n = 7) CS (n = 251) HC (n = 42) DPD vs HC Z-test, 
p value (2-sided)
CS vs HC Z-test, 
p value (2-sided)
Domain I: Derealization 6.0 (4–8) 3.0 (0–9) 0 (0–6) Z = 4.27, p   0.001 Z = 4.95, p   0.001
Domain II: Somatopsychic 
depersonalization
10.0 (3–13) 2.0 (0–14) 0 (0–3) Z = 4.56, p   0.001 Z = 5.71, p   0.001
Domain III: Autopsychic 
depersonalization
11.0 (1–15) 7.0 (0–16) 5.0 (0–11) Z = 2.29, p = 0.021 Z = 5.38, p   0.001
Domain IV: Affective 
depersonalization
6.0 (1–7) 3.0 (0–8) 1.0 (0–5) Z = 3.33, p   0.001 Z = 2.65, p = 0.008
SCI-DER Total score 31.0 (12–38) 14.0 (0–44) 7.0 (0–21) Z = 3.86, p   0.001 Z = 3.91, p   0.001
Abbreviations:
Table 6 SCI-DER total and domains scores in patients with and without a positive screening for dissociative symptoms (DES = 25) 
(median and interquartile range)
SCI-DER DES   25 (n = 46) DES   25 (n = 212) Z-test p value (2-sided)
Domain I: Derealization 6 (0–9) 2 (0–9) Z = 7.05 p  0.001
Domain II: Somatopsychic 
depersonalization
7 (0–14) 2 (0–13) Z = 6.38 p   0.001
Domain III: Autopsychic 
depersonalization
11.5 (2–16) 6 (0–15) Z = 7.08 p   0.001
Domain IV: Affective 
depersonalization
5 (2–8) 2 (0–8) Z = 6.95 p   0.001
SCI-DER Total score 30 (10–44) 13 (0–38) Z = 7.93 p   0.001
Abbreviations:Neuropsychiatric Disease and Treatment 2008:4(5) 984
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were not assessed, because, in our opinion, DP symptoms, 
although similar in their phenomenology to those reported by 
patients with affective disorders, are different in nature and 
can be detected only in an early phase of the disease when 
the self is not disrupted. It is therefore evident that studies 
replicating our results in this patients’ group are needed.
Overall, the SCI-DER proved to be a reliable and valid 
instrument to assess lifetime DP spectrum symptoms and 
our approach might help to identify speciﬁ  c phenotypes to 
be used in clinical, neurobiological, and genetic studies. 
Further investigations are warranted to clarify the potential 
utility of this approach in clinical practice and the temporal 
stability of SCI-DER scores in different clinical samples. 
Factor analyses of our instrument may further clarify the 
multifactor structure of DP and its complexity.
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The authors report no conﬂ  icts of interest in this work.
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Appendix A
Structured clinical interview for Depersonalization – Derealization Spectrum (SCI-DER)
Thank you for coming in to talk with me today. The interview we are going to do is focused on experiences that you may or 
may not have had in your life. We would like to know whether you have had these experiences at any time, even if it was 
a long time ago, when you were not under the inﬂ  uence of alcohol or drugs. There are several sections of the interview and 
it will take less than an hour to complete it. Do you have any questions before we start?
Domain I. Derealization
I’m going to ask you questions which refer to experiences that you may have had in the past or that you may be currently 
experiencing. They may have come on suddenly and unexpectedly or slowly and gradually.
Have you ever experienced just for a few seconds or for days or months…
1. … that the outside world was strange and unreal?  No  Yes
2.   …   that you felt detached from your surroundings as if there were a veil between you and 
the outside world?  No Yes
3. … that objects around you looked small or far away?  No  Yes
4. … the feeling that other people, objects, and the world around you were not real?  No  Yes
5.   …   a feeling as if you were looking at the world through a fog so that people and objects 
appeared unclear?  No Yes
6. … of being in a familiar place but ﬁ  nding it unfamiliar and strange?  No  Yes
7. … the feeling that you were living in a dream?  No  Yes
8. … feeling strange as if you were cut off from the world?  No  Yes
9. … that familiar voices (including your own) sounded far away and unreal?  No  Yes
Domain II: Somatopsychic depersonalization
Have you ever felt just for a few seconds or for days or months…
10. … that your body did not seem to belong to you?  No  Yes
11. … that parts of your body did not seem to belong to you?  No  Yes
12. … that parts of your body were disconnected from the rest of your body?  No  Yes
13. … that your body was very light as if it were ﬂ  oating on air?  No  Yes
14. … that your hands or your feet had become larger or smaller?  No  Yes
15. …   that you could not properly feel objects that you touched because it felt as if it was 
not you touching them?  No  Yes
16. … as if you were outside your body?  No  Yes
17. …   that you were not in charge of your movements, so that you felt “automatic” and 
mechanical as if you were a robot?  No  Yes
18. … that you had to touch yourself to make sure that you had a body or a real existence?  No  Yes
19.   …   that you had lost some bodily sensations (eg, of hunger and thirst) so that when you 
ate or drank, it felt like an automatic routine?  No  Yes
20. … that you were invisible?  No  Yes
21. … that you were able to ignore pain?  No  Yes
22. … that you were indifferent to the taste of food whether good or bad?  No  Yes
23. … that you were indifferent to the smell of things whether good or bad?  No  Yes
24.   …   that, when a part of your body hurt, you felt detached from the pain, as if it were 
somebody else’s pain?  No  Yes
25.   Ha  ve you ever purposely hurt, burned, or cut yourself in order to feel pain or make sure 
that you were real?  No YesNeuropsychiatric Disease and Treatment 2008:4(5) 986
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Domain III:   Autopsychic depersonalization
Have you ever felt just for a few seconds or for days or months…
26.  … that your behavior was out of control?  No  Yes
27.    …   that you were so detached from your thoughts that they seemed to have a “life” 
of their own?  No Yes
28.  … that one part of you did things while an observing part talked to you about them?  No  Yes
29.    …   that you did not have any thoughts at all, so that when you spoke it felt as if your 
words were being uttered by a robot?  No  Yes
30.  … that you were a little “spacey?”  No  Yes
31.    …   that there were moments of your life when you were very far away from what was 
happening to you?  No Yes
32.  … that you were a “detached observer” of yourself?  No  Yes
33.  … that you were a stranger to yourself or you did not recognize yourself in the mirror?  No  Yes
34.  … that you were going through the motions of working while your mind was somewhere else?  No  Yes
35.    …   that you could not picture things in your mind, for example, the face of a close friend 
or a familiar place?  No Yes
36.    …   as if things that you have recently done had taken place a long time ago, for example, 
something you did this morning feels as if it were done weeks ago?  No  Yes
37.  … that when in a new situation, you had been there before?  No  Yes
38.  … that when remembering a past event, it seemed so vivid it was as if you were reliving it?  No  Yes
39.    …   that after driving or riding in a car or bus or subway, you suddenly did not remember what 
happened during all or part of the trip?  No  Yes
40.    …   that after listening to someone talk, you suddenly realized that you did not hear part or all 
of what was said?  No Yes
41.  Have you ever found yourself in a place, having no idea how you got there?  No  Yes
Domain IV:   Affective depersonalization
Have you ever felt just for a few seconds or for days or months…
42. … that you can turn off or detach from your emotions?  No  Yes
43. … that your emotions were not in your control?  No  Yes
44. … that what you were looking at seemed “ﬂ  at” or “lifeless?”  No  Yes
45. … that when you wept or laughed, you did not feel any emotions at all?  No  Yes
46. … that you did not feel any affection toward your family or close friends?  No  Yes
47.   …   that you were not frightened at all in a situation that you would normally ﬁ  nd frightening 
or distressing?  No Yes
48.   …   that you are able to do things with amazing ease and spontaneity that would usually be 
difﬁ  cult for you (for example, sports, work, social situations, etc.)?  No  Yes
49.   …   that you were detached from memories of things that happened to you as if you had not 
been involved in them?  No  Yes